I’m an assistant professor of philosophy and the director of cognitive science at Montclair State University.
I’m interested in how humans come to know––and how much they can know––about their environments, themselves, and the relation between environment and self. To this end, my work explores problems about perception, introspection, consciousness, and mental representation. I’m also interested in normative questions about whether being behind a “veil of perception” would make our lives less meaningful.
Here’s my CV.
morganj [at] montclair [dot] edu
P U B L I C A T I O N S
NEW: What the Senses Cannot ‘Say’
Philosophical Quarterly, 2022
To accommodate the representational limits of perception, I argue for a version of representationalism that is internalist with respect to spatial content.
Content Externalism without Thought Experiments?
Analysis, 2021
I show that a thought-experiment-free argument against content internalism opens up a parallel argument against content externalism.
The Phenomenal Representation of Size
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2020
I argue that we only represent relative size in experience. I also address a dilemma about the units in which our experiences represent space.
I argue that an objection to naïve realism based on its predictions about phenomenal similarity fails.
I N – P R O G R E S S
[a paper on why the problem of consciousness is hard]
[a paper on how we know that we see things]
[a paper on how to avoid becoming a nihilist]
[a paper mediating a dispute about perceptual phenomenology]
[a paper on free actions and necessary truths]
[a paper on problems of consciousness and the sensible qualities]
Outside of philosophy, I like music, playing guitar & video games, collecting enamel pins that I never wear, and hanging out with my extraordinarily handsome cat Redford (pictured below).
