I’m an associate professor of philosophy and the director of cognitive science at Montclair State University.
I like to think and write about how humans come to know––and how much they can know––about their environments, themselves, and the relation between environment and self. I explore these issues through traditional problems in the philosophy of mind (e.g. problems about about perception, introspection, and consciousness). You can find my published work below.
Here’s my CV.
morganj [at] montclair [dot] edu
P U B L I C A T I O N S
Philosophical Quarterly, 2022
To accommodate the representational limits of perception, I argue for a version of representationalism that is internalist with respect to spatial content.
Content Externalism without Thought Experiments?
Analysis, 2021
I show that a thought-experiment-free argument against content internalism opens up a parallel argument against content externalism.
The Phenomenal Representation of Size
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2020
I argue that we only represent relative size in experience. I also address a dilemma about the units in which our experiences represent space.
I argue that an objection to naïve realism based on its predictions about phenomenal similarity fails.
I N – P R O G R E S S
[a paper on why the problem of consciousness is hard]
[a paper on how we know that we see things]
Outside of philosophy, I like music, playing guitar & video games, collecting enamel pins that I never wear, and hanging out with my extraordinarily handsome cat Redford (pictured below).
