I’m an associate professor of philosophy and the director of cognitive science at Montclair State University.
My philosophical interests are broad. But, for the most part, I like to think and write about how humans come to know––and how much they can know––about their environments, themselves, and the relation between environment and self. I explore these issues through traditional problems in the philosophy of mind (e.g. problems about about perception, introspection, and consciousness). You can find my published and forthcoming work below.
Here’s my CV.
morganj [at] montclair [dot] edu
P U B L I C A T I O N S
NEW: Non-Inferential Knowledge of Perception
Philosophers’ Imprint, 2025
I develop a novel account of how one knows that she sees something. The account is compatible with the transparency of visual perception yet, unlike existing accounts, does not require that one perform an inference in order to know that she sees.Philosophical Quarterly, 2022
To accommodate the representational limits of perception, I argue for a version of representationalism that is internalist with respect to spatial content.
Content Externalism without Thought Experiments?
Analysis, 2021
I show that a thought-experiment-free argument against content internalism opens up a parallel argument against content externalism.
The Phenomenal Representation of Size
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2020
I argue that undetectable inflation shoes that we only represent relative size in experience. I also address a dilemma about the units in which our experiences represent space.
I argue that an objection to naïve realism based on its predictions about phenomenal similarity fails.
I N – P R O G R E S S
[a project on why the problem of consciousness is hard]